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Non-Technical Summary
Capital structure adjustments can be used to reduce the total tax burden on company
investment since the taxation of the return on equity and debt capital differs in most
countries. At the corporate level, interest payments reduce taxable profits while such a
deduction is not feasible in the case of equity financing. At the shareholder level, effective
tax rates on dividend and interest income differ as well. Therefore, the relative tax benefits
of different sources of finance are supposed to have an impact on financing decisions.
Theory suggests that both corporate profit tax and personal capital income taxes should
be considered in order to analyze the tax impact on capital structure choices.
Since previous literature mainly focuses on the taxation of corporate profits, empirical ev-
idence with respect to the possible impact of personal capital income taxation on capital
structure choices is still scarce. Therefore, this paper aims at analyzing the effects from
different taxation of equity and debt on capital structures of European firms while taking
into account both personal and corporate income taxation. For the empirical analysis we
employ a rich panel of firm-level financial accounting data of companies located in 23 Euro-
pean countries, taken from the AMADEUS data base. In contrast to other recent papers,
we focus mainly on stand-alone companies. Furthermore, we collect detailed information
about the tax systems of the considered countries during the period from 2000 until 2005.
The empirical results suggest that a higher tax benefit of debt has the expected significant
positive impact on companies’ financial leverage. Additional analysis confirms that debt
ratios are affected by personal income taxation: the level of dividend taxes has a positive
impact on the debt to assets ratio, whereas the taxation of personal interest income nega-
tively affects corporate leverage. In addition, we find evidence that the capital structures
of smaller companies react more heavily to higher tax benefits of debt. In contrast, this tax
benefit only has a minor impact on the financial decisions of parent companies belonging
to a group of affiliated firms.
Zusammenfassung (Summary in German)
Anpassungen der Kapitalstruktur stellen ein geeignetes Mittel dar, um die Steuerbelastung
von Unternehmen zu reduzieren. Die steuerliche Behandlung von Dividendenausschu¨ttung-
en und Zinseinku¨nften unterscheidet sich in den meisten europa¨ischen La¨nder sowohl auf
Unternehmensebene als auch in der perso¨nlichen Einkommensbesteuerung. So sind Zins-
aufwendungen regelma¨ßig von der steuerlichen Bemessungsgrundlage abzugsfa¨hig, wa¨hrend
Dividendenzahlungen aus dem bereits versteuerten Unternehmensgewinn geleistet werden.
Auch die perso¨nliche Einkommensteuer der Anteilseigner knu¨pft ha¨ufig an die Art der
Kapitaleinku¨nfte an. Es liegt daher nahe, einen Einfluss der steuerlichen Begu¨nstigung
eines bestimmten Finanzierungswegs auf betriebliche Finanzierungsentscheidungen zu ver-
muten. Aus theoretischer Sicht sollten bei einer Untersuchung des Einflusses steuer-
licher Vorteile auf Finanzierungsentscheidungen sowohl Unternehmensteuern als auch die
perso¨nliche Kapitaleinkommensbesteuerung einbezogen werden.
Die bisherige empirische Literatur stellt ha¨ufig die Auswirkungen der Unternehmensbesteu-
erung auf Kapitalstrukturentscheidungen in den Mittelpunkt. Nur wenige Studien beziehen
hingegen den Einfluss der perso¨nlichen Besteuerung von Kapitaleinku¨nften ein. Daher
analysiert dieser Beitrag die Wirkung der unterschiedlichen Besteuerung von Eigen- und
Fremdkapital auf die Kapitalstruktur europa¨ischer Unternehmen unter Beru¨cksichtigung
der Unternehmens- und der Kapitaleinkommensbesteuerung. Die Untersuchung basiert
auf einem umfangreichen Panel mit Unternehmensdaten aus 23 europa¨ischen La¨ndern, das
der AMADEUS Datenbank entnommen wurde. Anders als in anderen ju¨ngst erschienenen
Beitra¨gen stehen in unserer Studie schwerpunktma¨ßig konzernunabha¨ngige Firmen im Mit-
telpunkt. Zur Erfassung der steuerlichen Finanzierungsanreize verwenden wir detaillierte
Informationen u¨ber Steuersysteme und Steuertarife der betrachteten La¨nder im Zeitraum
von 2000 bis 2005.
Die empirischen Ergebnisse legen es nahe, dass ein steuerlicher Vorteil der Fremdfinanzierung
wie erwartet den Verschuldungsgrad erho¨ht. Weiterfu¨hrende Analysen besta¨tigen, dass
die Fremdkapitalquote von Unternehmen durch die perso¨nliche Besteuerung von Kapi-
taleinku¨nften beeinflusst wird: Die Ho¨he des Steuersatzes auf Dividendeneinku¨nfte hat
einen positiven Einfluss auf die Fremdkapitalquote, wa¨hrend eine ho¨here Besteuerung von
Zinseinku¨nften den Verschuldungsgrad von Unternehmen senkt. Daru¨ber hinaus finden wir
einen sta¨rkeren Effekt der Besteuerung auf die Kapitalstruktur bei kleineren Gesellschaften,
wohingegen dieser Einfluss bei Muttergesellschaften von Konzernen schwa¨cher zu sein
scheint.
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1 Introduction
Capital structure decisions are likely to affect companies’ tax payments, since corporate
taxation typically distinguishes between different sources of finance. Interest payments
can generally be deducted from taxable profits while such a deduction is not available in
the case of equity financing. Taxation of capital income at the shareholder level often
differentiates between the types of capital as well. Therefore, it can be expected that the
relative tax benefits of different sources of finance have an impact on financing decisions.
Theory suggests that both corporate profit tax and personal capital income taxes should
be considered in order to analyze the tax consequences of capital structure choices more
accurately (Graham, 2003).
Previous empirical literature dealing with tax effects on capital structure choices has often
focused solely on the taxation of corporate profits, thereby neglecting capital income tax-
ation at the shareholder level. Empirical evidence with respect to the possible impact of
personal capital income taxation on capital structure choices is still scarce. However, stud-
ies considering these aspects (Givoly et al., 1992; Graham, 1999; Alworth and Arachi, 2001;
Gordon and Lee, 2001, 2007) find significant effects of personal taxation. While previous
studies are based on data from one single country, mainly the US, empirical evidence for an
international sample of companies is generally lacking. Employing an international dataset
may yield generalizable findings which are not bound to specific national characteristics
in tax regimes and capital market conditions. Therefore, this paper aims at analyzing the
effects from different taxation of equity and debt on capital structures of European firms.
Tax incentives for using a particular source of finance differ significantly among European
countries. Moreover, during the last decade, considerable reforms of company and capital
income taxation have been implemented in Europe. For instance, 18 out of 23 countries
included in our sample have altered their corporate tax rate at least once between 2000 and
2005. Top statutory tax rates on personal income were altered in 17 countries during this
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period. Tax reforms have been set up predominantly in order to enhance fiscal conditions
for internationally mobile capital and profits. Furthermore, equal tax rates for all types
of personal capital income have been preferred by national legislators for administrative
reasons. Given that interest payments and dividends are taxed differently at the company
level, this could lead to effective unequal treatment of debt and equity. Germany, for
example, has adopted a significant tax reform which will result in a massive tax incentive
for debt financing in 2009. Therefore, we are interested in how flexible capital structure
decisions are with respect to taxation, given a bunch of non-tax determinants of capital
structures. If a company’s capital structure decision is significantly restricted by non-
tax factors, distortions of financial decisions due to taxation may lead to inefficiencies in
investment decisions and risk allocation. Thus, evidence about the tax effects on capital
structures for European firms would be expedient.
For the empirical analysis we employ European firm-level data taken from the AMADEUS
database provided by Bureau van Dijk. We use a rich panel of firm-level financial ac-
counting data of companies located in 23 European countries. In contrast to other recent
papers, we focus mainly on stand-alone companies. Compared to firms which belong to a
company group, these companies feature minor opportunities for internal financing. Rely-
ing on capital from outside investors, it can be presumed that stand-alone companies are
particularly affected by variations in personal income tax rates. Furthermore, we collect
detailed information about the tax systems of the considered countries during the period
from 2000 until 2005. Since corporate taxation and personal income taxation vary among
countries and have often been amended during the considered period, our identification
strategy relies on the international variation of the tax variables. The empirical results
clearly suggest that a higher tax benefit of debt has the expected significant positive im-
pact on companies’ financial leverage. Additional analysis confirms that fractions of debt
are affected by personal income taxation: the level of dividend taxes has a positive impact
on the debt to assets ratio, whereas the taxation of personal interest income negatively
affects corporate leverage. Furthermore, we find evidence that the capital structures of
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smaller companies react more heavily to higher tax benefits of debt. In contrast, this tax
benefit only has a minor impact on the financial decisions of parent companies belonging
to a group of affiliated firms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review theoretical
and empirical literature dealing with tax and non-tax determinants of capital structure.
Section 3 describes the institutional background of European taxation systems and the
dataset we are using. Regression estimates are reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
Value relevance of capital structure choice and the impact of taxation on financing and
investment decisions have been subject to extensive prior discussion in finance literature.
Although the rationale of Modigliani and Miller (1958) who propose the irrelevance of
capital structure for firm value in perfect capital markets has been generally accepted, the
presence of financial innovation and the high cost of corporate financial decision making
seem to provide evidence for the value relevance of financial structure choice (Ross, 1977;
Myers, 2001).
For the purpose of this paper, literature following Modigliani and Miller’s seminal paper
(for a review see Myers, 2001; Graham, 2003) can be classified into two streams: a) papers
which focus on taxation as a determinant of capital structure and b) ‘non-tax approaches’
which centre bankruptcy costs as well as governance and information aspects of capital
structure choice. As our focus lies on the effects of taxation, we refer to the latter stream
of literature only in order to employ adequate control variables.
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2.1 Capital Structure Choice and Taxation
While suggesting a fundamental irrelevance of financial decisions for firm value, Modigliani
and Miller already refer to company taxation as a reason for preferring debt to equity
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Within their framework of perfect capital markets, the
value of a permanently leveraged firm is generated by adding the value of the corporate tax
shield of debt to the value of an identical but unleveraged company (Modigliani and Miller,
1963). Even though there is still an ongoing debate about the calculation of the value of
the tax shield (see e.g. Fernandez, 2004, 2005; Fieten et al., 2005; Cooper and Nyborg,
2006), the proposed tax advantage of debt would empirically imply a corner solution.
Miller (1977) develops a broader perspective on tax incentives by explicitly integrating
personal income taxation into his model. He concludes that, under existing personal tax
concessions made to equity income, there is no optimal capital structure for any single
firm (Miller, 1977). In contrast, De Angelo and Masulis develop a theoretical explanation
for the existence of a firm-specific optimal debt to equity ratio by taking alternative paths
to reduce the corporate tax burden (e.g., depreciation allowances) into account. While a
company’s effective marginal tax rate on interest deduction depends on these non-debt tax
shield substitutes and declines as leverage increases, the marginal personal tax disadvantage
of interest income remains constant (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980). This leads to a unique
interior optimum, even in the absence of any non-fiscal incentives (such as bankruptcy
costs etc.).
Examining De Angelo’s and Masulis’ hypothesis, MacKie-Mason (1990) finds supporting
empirical evidence by analyzing US firms’ probability of preferring debt over equity issues.
As De Angelo and Masulis proposed, existing loss carryforwards (and investment tax cred-
its) diminish the effective tax advantage of debt. Using a matched pairs approach, Graham
and Tucker (2006) find evidence that non-debt tax shields caused by tax shelters act as a
substitute for the use of debt. In their sample consisting of 76 firms, the 38 firms using tax
4
shelters have debt ratios that are more than 5 percent lower than those of their matches.
Empirical researchers face the problem of identifying sufficient cross-sectional or timeseries
variation in firm-specific tax incentives when using a one-country sample. One stream of
studies (for a review see also Graham, 1996b; Alworth and Arachi, 2003; Weichenrieder,
2006) consequently focuses on a more detailed view of effective corporate tax incentives.
Instead of using indirect proxies for the effective tax advantage of debt, Graham (1996a,
2000) calculates firm-specific marginal corporate tax rates. By employing a random walk
simulation of future corporate earnings, he is able to show that taxation causes changes in
corporate leverage ratios. Examining a dataset of Italian companies, Alworth and Arachi
(2001) use the variation in additional tax savings due to differences in profitability or
because of an existing loss carryforward. Gropp (2002) investigates the effects of cross-
sectional variation in corporate tax rates. He employs regional variation in German local
tax rates and identifies a positive effect of higher tax rates on the use of debt.
Using international accounting and tax data rather than a mere national sample seems
to be an appropriate way of meeting the concerns that empirical results arise from the
specifics of a particular national tax code. While prior empirical studies focus on samples
with exclusively domestic companies, Rajan and Zingales (1995) analyse an international
dataset consisting of companies from the G-7 countries. They find a positive aggregate
correlation between net tax advantages and average leverage changes in five out of seven
countries. Newberry and Dhalival (2001) find that the bond issuance location of U.S.
multinationals is affected by the respective tax rates in their subsidiaries’ host countries,
as well as by the existence of domestic tax-loss carryforwards. Moore and Ruane (2005) and
Huizinga, Laeven and Nicode`me (2008) state a positive impact of the local tax rate as well
as of tax differentials across countries on the financial leverage of European multinationals’
affiliates.
Whereas there are several other studies on the impact of corporate taxation on financing
decisions, one very rarely comes across empirical evidence featuring international varia-
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tion in personal taxation. This could be due to the fact that the focus of many recent
studies lies on multinationals with enhanced internal financial planning opportunities (see
e.g. Jog and Tang, 2001; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2004; Buettner and Wamser, 2007;
Buettner et al., 2008). Earlier studies considering personal income taxation are mainly
based on single country samples. Givoly et al. (1992) find a negative impact of differences
in dividend yields on changes in leverage of US firms. They interpret this result as an
indirect indicator for the impact of personal taxation. Graham (1999) analyses the effects
of personal income taxation using cross-sectional differences in US companies’ payout ra-
tios in order to estimate the variation in personal income tax. He determines a potential
net tax advantage of debt by subtracting the ‘personal tax penalty’ from the marginal
corporate tax rate. This ‘penalty’ is induced by a higher personal taxation of interest
compared to dividend payments and capital gains. Depending on the respective design of
the tax code, its amount varies with a company’s payout policy. Although it does not im-
ply any cross-sectional variation in statutory personal interest tax rates, Graham’s model
yields significant cross-sectional effects of personal income taxation. Following a similar
approach, Alworth and Arachi (2001) find cross-sectional as well as time-series effects of
personal income taxation for a sample of Italian companies. Gordon and Lee (2001, 2007)
who explicitly include personal tax rates imposed on interest income find that personal
income taxation has significant and considerable adverse effects on the debt to assets ratio
of US firms.
We extend the scope of former international studies dealing with tax impacts on capital
structures to personal income taxation. Using tax data from 23 European countries pro-
vides us with cross-sectional variation in personal tax rates and with greater intertemporal
variation. Like Rajan and Zingales (1995), we use the top personal tax rate to calculate the
net tax benefit of debt. Unlike their groundbreaking paper, we use regression analysis in
order to control for ‘non-tax’ determinants of capital structure choice. Following Graham
(1999), we consider the tax consequences of debt relative to equity. If we denote the cor-
porate profit tax rate by τC , the additional personal income tax rate on dividend income
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by τD, and the combined corporate and personal income tax rate on interest income by τ I ,
then the tax benefit from debt financing relative to equity financing ∆ can be written as
∆ = (τC + τD)− τ I . (1)
The term inside the brackets constitutes the total tax burden in the case of equity finance
and the second term shows the effective tax level in the case of debt finance. The higher
∆ is, the higher the relative tax benefit from interest deductions. Note that ∆ implies
an immediate profit distribution. In our empirical analysis, we will also relax this strict
assumption. As a result, the effect of the dividend tax should decrease while an additional
impact of capital gains taxes τG is to be expected.
2.2 Capital Structure Choice and Non-Tax Factors
In order to isolate the impact of corporate and personal taxation on capital structure
choices, several non-tax factors influencing corporate financing have to be considered (Har-
ris and Raviv, 1991; Myers, 2001, Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson, 2006). The most
prominent factors in finance literature are bankruptcy costs, agency conflicts, and infor-
mation asymmetry. Furthermore, as we examine an international sample, institutional and
macroeconomic differences across countries have to be controlled for. For example, Rajan
and Zingales (1995) examine the impact of the banking system on leverage but find no sig-
nificant effects. La Porta et al. (1997) consider investor protection across 49 countries and
show that the respective legal environment has an impact on debt and equity financing.
It is also quite possible for variation in macroeconomic factors to influence capital structure
choices over time. De Angelo and Masulis (1980) propose that a higher inflation promotes
debt financing by inducing a decline in the real value of non-debt tax shields. In contrast,
Huizinga, Laeven and Nicode`me (2008) explain their finding of a negative effect of inflation
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on debt financing by pointing to a higher risk premium on debt obligations within an
inflationary environment. The corporate interest rate could constitute another determinant
of capital structure. A higher cost of debt relative to equity financing should lead to a
shifting of financial sources. However, firm-specific interest rates are likely to be endogenous
with capital structure choices.
At the company level, potential costs of financial distress could be a determinant of capital
structure choice. The trade-off theory suggests that a company’s optimal leverage lies at the
point where incremental tax advantages and disadvantages from increased risk of financial
distress are equal. Therefore, profitable firms with a lower risk of financial distress should
have a higher leverage. The pecking order theory predicts higher leverage only for profitable
companies whose internal cash flows outbalance real investment opportunities (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999). Agency conflicts between management and different groups of
investors could also be a reason for variation in capital structure. For instance, Jensen
(1986) considers increased leverage as a means of reducing management discretion. For
companies with limited growth opportunities, interest payments made with free cash flows
could avoid unprofitable investments by the management. Thus, the impact of profitability
on the debt ratio is not clear.
The value of total assets indicating company size may also affect firm’s financial structure.
For example, it might represent a proxy for the quality of information available to outside
investors because disclosure regulations are often linked directly or indirectly to size criteria
(Chan, Faff and Ramsay, 2005). Reduced uncertainty due to high quality information could
encourage equity issues which are informationally sensitive. This would lead to a lower
leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Harris and Raviv (1990) find a positive correlation
between companies’ liquidation value (proxied by the fraction of tangible assets) and the
optimal debt level. An increase in the liquidation value makes a liquidation less costly for
shareholders as well as for debt holders, who can resort to liquidation in order to attain a
more effective management control.
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For the empirical analysis, we will consider several firm-level variables such as profitability,
size or tangibility to control for the above mentioned non-tax determinants of capital
structure. Furthermore, company-specific fixed effects will be used to control unobserved
firm-specific differences which are time-invariant. Therefore, we are able to control for
determinants such as industry, as well as product and customer characteristics which are
analysed in recent empirical studies (e.g., Kale and Shahrur, 2007), provided that they
remain constant over time.
3 Description of the Data
For the empirical analysis it is crucial to have sufficient variations in the tax variables. In
this section, we examine the respective tax institutions during the period from 2000 until
2005 in European countries. Furthermore, we describe the firm-level financial accounting
data and other control variables used.
3.1 Personal and Corporate Taxation
In Europe, tax systems are very distinct. Typically, taxation of company profits depends
on the type of capital. With regard to equity capital, the corporate profit tax and divi-
dend taxation at the shareholder level must be considered. In the case of debt financing,
interest payments for debt capital can be deducted from taxable profits at the corporate
level. However, it is necessary that restrictions of the interest deductibility are considered
in several countries. Moreover, taxation of interest as personal income also leads to a tax
burden on debt financing. During the considered time period from 2000 until 2005, sev-
eral amendments of company tax systems took place in European countries. As a result
variation in the tax variables can be ascribed to changes in the corporate tax rate (mainly
tax rate cuts), on the one hand, and to several amendments of personal capital income
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taxation, on the other hand. The latter include changes of personal income tax rates and
reforms relating to the integration of corporate taxation into the personal income tax.
From 2000 until 2005, several tax rate cuts of the statutory corporate profit tax rate came
into force. With regard to all 23 European countries covered in our sample1, the mean
corporate tax rate τC constituted 30.5% in 2000 and fell to 25.3% in 2005. Only five of
these 23 countries did not reduce their corporate tax rate during the considered six-year
period. Table 1 presents tax rates on corporate income (column 2) as well as effective
dividend and interest tax rates at the shareholder level (columns 3 and 4) for the year
2005.
For the empirical analysis, we assume that the shareholder falls within the top income
tax brackets in the same country in which the company is located.2 Furthermore, we
accurately calculate the effective additional tax payment as percentage of the net dividend
distribution depending on the type of tax system. The additional dividend tax is referred
to as τD, i.e. the effective tax rate imposed on distributed profits is compiled. Due to
several amendments of dividend tax rates and changes in the integration of corporate
and personal income taxation, the mean effective dividend tax level of the 23 countries
examined increased slightly from 14.3 per cent in 2000 to 14.8 per cent in 2005. In 18
countries, the tax level on dividends changed at least once during the six-year period.
The taxation of dividends at the shareholder level depends on the integration system of
corporate taxation into personal income taxation. In principle, three categories of tax
systems can be distinguished: classical tax systems, shareholder relief systems, and impu-
tation systems. In the case of the so-called classical system, dividends are taxed by the
personal income tax rate without any relief. Thus, this system, which is applied in our
1 See Table 1 for a list of all considered countries.
2 We do not have detailed information about the tax situation of the shareholders. It seems reason-
able to assume that the relevant shareholder is taxed in the top tax brackets, since only shareholders
with comparably high amounts of capital interest are able to influence company financing decisions
materially.
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sample in Ireland and Switzerland, leads to a double taxation of distributed profits, since
the dividend tax adds to the corporate tax at the company level. For Ireland, e.g., the
additional effective tax burden on distributed profits at the shareholder level (see column 3
of Table 1) is calculated by multiplying the remaining distributable profits after corporate
taxation with the top statutory tax rate on dividends: (1− 0.125) 0.42 = 0.3675.
Table 1: Effective Tax Rates in Europe 2005
Country τC τD τ I τG Integration system
Austria 0.2500 0.1875 0.2500 0.1875 Shareholder-relief
Belgium 0.3399 0.1650 0.1500 0.0000 Shareholder-relief
Czech Republic 0.2600 0.1110 0.1500 0.0000 Shareholder-relief
Estonia 0.0000 0.2400 0.0000 0.2400 Shareholder-relief
Finland 0.2600 0.1181 0.2800 0.2072 Shareholder-relief
France 0.3493 0.2199 0.2700 0.1757 Shareholder-relief
Germanya) 0.3947 0.1341 0.5085 0.1341 Shareholder-relief
Greece 0.3200 0.0000 0.1000 0.1360 Shareholder-relief
Hungary 0.1771 0.2057 0.0171 0.2057 Shareholder-relief
Iceland 0.1800 0.0820 0.1000 0.0820 Shareholder-relief
Ireland 0.1250 0.3675 0.2000 0.1750 Classical
Italy 0.3725 0.0784 0.1675 0.1114 Shareholder-relief
Latvia 0.1500 0.0000 0.2500 0.0000 Shareholder-relief
Luxembourg 0.3038 0.1356 0.3895 0.1356 Shareholder-relief
Netherlands 0.3150 0.1713 0.2500 0.1713 Shareholder-relief
Norway 0.2800 0.0000 0.2800 0.0000 Imputation
Poland 0.1900 0.1539 0.1900 0.1539 Shareholder-relief
Portugal 0.2500 0.1500 0.2000 0.0000 Shareholder-relief
Slovak Republic 0.1900 0.0000 0.1900 0.1539 Shareholder-relief
Slovenia 0.2500 0.2438 0.5000 0.0000 Shareholder-relief
Spain 0.3500 0.1495 0.4500 0.0975 Imputation
Switzerlandb) 0.2132 0.3176 0.4036 0.0000 Classical
United Kingdom 0.3000 0.1750 0.4000 0.1000 Imputation
τC denotes the corporate tax rate on company profits including local profit taxes. τD denotes the effective
additional tax burden on distributed profits due to dividend taxation at the shareholder level. The effective
tax rate on interest income τ I includes interest deductability restrictions at the corporate level. τG
denotes the effective tax on capital gains in case of a qualified shareholding. The tax data are collected
from several annual volumes of the European Tax Handbook edited by the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD) and from international tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG.
a) We assume the mean multiplier of the local trade tax of municipalities, which have a minimum of 50.000
inhabitants each. Church taxes are not considered. b) The canton of Zurich is taken into consideration.
If interest payments can be deducted from taxable profits at the company level and are
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taxed at the same tax rate as dividend income, equity finance is obviously discriminated
in the case of a classical system. For this reason, so-called shareholder-relief systems have
lower tax levels on dividends compared to other personal income. Typical methods of
relief are the application of a lower tax rate on dividend income or the full or partial tax
exemption of dividends. In Austria, e.g., dividends were subject to a reduced statutory tax
rate of 25% in 2005, compared to a top income tax rate of 50%. Therefore, the effective
additional tax burden of distributed profits at the shareholder level (see column 3 of Table
1) results in: (1− 0.25) 0.25 = 0.1875.
Shareholder-relief systems are widespread among the considered European countries and
have increased in popularity ever since the third method of dividend taxation, the so-
called imputation method, has been abolished in several European countries.3 Under
an imputation system, double taxation of distributed dividends is avoided or mitigated
by means of an imputation credit. Corporate tax payments can be credited, to some
extent, against the dividend tax liabilities of the shareholder. This leads to smaller effective
dividend tax payments. For example, in 2005 a tax credit of one ninth of the paid dividend
could be set off against the shareholders’ tax liability in the United Kingdom. Under the
top statutory tax rate on dividends τD adds up to (1− 0.3 + 1
9
0.7) 0.325− 1
9
0.7 = 0.175.
In 2000, six of the considered 23 countries had an imputation system, whereas in 2005 only
three imputation systems were still in force.4 In 2008 only one of the considered countries,
the United Kingdom, still uses an imputation system.
In the case of debt financing, interest payments for debt capital can be deducted from
taxable profits at the corporate level. However, paid interest must be taxed at the level of
the lender, for example, as personal income. This is particularly relevant if the shareholders
3 Imputation systems were abolished because the restriction of imputation systems to pure domestic
dividend distributions is contrary to European law (Cf. ECJ of 9.7.2006, C-319/02 (Maninnen); ECJ
of 3.6.2007, C-292/04 (Meilicke)).
4 In 2000 the following countries had an imputation system in place; the year of abolishment is indicated
in parentheses: Finland (2005), France (2005), Germany (2001), Norway (2006), Spain (2007), the
United Kingdom.
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provide their company with additional capital by means of shareholder loans. In accordance
with the assumption made in the case of dividend taxation, we assume that the lender is
taxed in the top income tax brackets in the same country in which the company is located.
Moreover, at some locations, interest deductibility at the corporate level is restricted to
some extent. In this case, an additional tax burden on debt financing must be considered.
For example, in the case of the Italian local tax (IRAP) no interest deduction is allowed. In
the case of the German trade tax (Gewerbesteuer), only half of all interest payments could
be deducted. We take such an additional tax burden into consideration when constructing
the effective tax rate on interest, denoted by τ I . Several changes of the tax rate on interest
income provide some variation in that variable. During the considered period, the mean
tax rate on interest of the 23 investigated countries fell from 27.2 per cent to 24.8 per cent.
Capital structure choices depend on the relative tax effects of different sources of finance.
Therefore, we construct the tax benefit from debt financing relative to equity financing in
accordance with expression (1) as (τC + τD) − τ I . Table 2 shows the tax benefit of debt
in each of the considered 23 countries and for each year during the period of 2000 until
2005. Most tax systems of the regarded countries discriminate equity-financed investments
against debt financing. In 2005, for instance, we can observe a positive tax benefit of debt
in 19 of the 23 considered countries.
Finally, if corporate profits are partly retained, the choice between equity and debt financ-
ing may be affected by the taxation of capital gains, since a shareholder can sell shares
before profits are distributed. The taxes on capital gains can cause an increase of the cost
of capital in the case of equity financing, and thus, higher capital gains taxes may lead
to a smaller share of equity capital. However, the impact of capital gains taxes depends
on the opportunity to deduct the purchase price of the shares from the taxable amounts.
In accordance with the assumptions about dividend and interest income tax, we assume a
qualified shareholding and taxation at the top income tax brackets. The effective tax rate
imposed on capital gains τG is calculated assuming that corporate taxes are capitalized at
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Table 2: Tax Benefit of Debt Relative to Equity
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Austria 0.2550 0.2550 0.2550 0.2550 0.2550 0.1875
Belgium 0.3414 0.3414 0.3414 0.2889 0.2889 0.3549
Czech Republic 0.2635 0.2635 0.2635 0.2635 0.2380 0.2210
Estonia 0.2600 0.2600 0.2600 0.2600 0.2600 0.2400
Finland 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0981
France 0.3882 0.3737 0.3632 0.3342 0.2906 0.2992
Germanya) 0.0301 -0.0278 -0.0278 -0.0166 -0.0019 0.0203
Greece 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2200
Hungary 0.3407 0.3407 0.3407 0.3407 0.3243 0.3657
Iceland 0.2700 0.2700 0.1620 0.1620 0.1620 0.1620
Ireland 0.3712 0.3320 0.3128 0.2925 0.2925 0.2925
Italy 0.3184 0.3097 0.3097 0.2922 0.2834 0.2834
Latvia 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0300 -0.0600 -0.1000 -0.1000
Luxembourg 0.0505 0.0787 0.0499 0.0499 0.0499 0.0499
Netherlands -0.0875 0.2625 0.2588 0.2588 0.2588 0.2363
Norway 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Poland 0.2400 0.1880 0.1880 0.1795 0.1539 0.1539
Portugal 0.2764 0.2764 0.2400 0.2400 0.2000 0.2000
Slovak Republic 0.2465 0.2465 0.2125 0.2125 0.0000 0.0000
Slovenia -0.0250 -0.0250 -0.0250 -0.0250 -0.0250 -0.0062
Spain 0.0495 0.0495 0.0495 0.0495 0.0495 0.0495
Switzerlandb) 0.1409 0.1444 0.1441 0.1437 0.1437 0.1272
United Kingdom 0.0750 0.0750 0.0750 0.0750 0.0750 0.0750
The tax benefit of debt relative to equity is calculated according to (τC + τD) − τ I , where top personal
income tax brackets are assumed. The tax data are collected from several annual volumes of the European
Tax Handbook edited by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and from international
tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG. a) We assume the mean multiplier of the local
trade tax of municipalities, which have a minimum of 50.000 inhabitants each. Church taxes are not
considered. b) The canton of Zurich is taken into consideration.
the expense of the selling shareholder. In additional sensitivity analyses we also consider
tax rates in the case of non-qualified shareholding.5
5 Differences in the capital gains taxation between qualified shareholding (above certain threshold of
participation) and non-qualified shareholding are relevant in the case of Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.
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3.2 Data Set
Firm-level data are taken from the AMADEUS database provided by Bureau van Dijk.
AMADEUS is a comprehensive firm-level database, which contains publicised information
about European companies in a standardised format. However, publication obligations
and enforcements differ significantly between countries. Therefore, the distribution of
the considered companies does not have to reflect the distribution of companies among
European countries. German companies, for example, represent only less than 1% of all
considered companies in the data set, which is obviously an underreporting. Moreover,
complete data on financial accounting is not always available in the AMADEUS database,
although the firm is generally included in the database. We therefore restrict the sample to
companies, for which financial accounting data of at least two successive years in the time
period from 1999 until 2005 is available.6 Thus, we are able to control for the heterogeneity
between individual firms by means of a simple within transformation (cf. Lemmon, Roberts
and Zender, 2008). Since we are interested in the effect of the corporate tax system on
capital structure choices, we only employ data of incorporated companies. Observations
of the financial sector as well as observations without an industry classification are not
included either.7 Furthermore, we use detailed annual information about the company
group structures and focus exclusively on corporations that are not controlled to more than
50% by another corporation during the considered period.8 Finally, our sample contains
firm-level data of corporations located in 23 European countries. In addition to 20 member
states of the European Union, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are also included.9
6 We also remove observations with implausible financial accounting data such as unequal total assets
and total capital employed or implausible high profits or losses.
7 We employ the Nomenclature ge´ne´rale des activite´s e´conomiques (NACE) industry classification.
8 In the case of subsidiaries, intercompany debt seems to be an important source of finance (Desai, Foley,
Hines, 2004). Since we are interested in the effects of personal income taxation on the shareholder level,
we remove subsidiaries from our sample. Furthermore, all companies which switch between stand-alone
and group-member status during the considered period from 2000 until 2005 are removed.
9 Although generally covered by the database, no data are included from the EU member states Denmark
and Sweden because the data export is limited in the case of these countries for technical reasons. In
case of Lithuania, no data are provided which have a complete set of firm-level variables. Moreover,
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The firm-level variables are taken from the financial accounting data provided by the
AMADEUS database. In our empirical analysis we employ, as the dependent variable, the
debt to assets ratio calculated as the fraction of debt to total assets using the respective
firm-level data from financial accounting. Furthermore, we use a dummy variable indicating
if a company has a loss carryforward. The dummy equals one if the respective company’s
profit in the previous year was negative. Otherwise, the dummy is zero.10 Hence, we
generally lose one observation of each considered company, in particular all the observations
in 1999. A company which has a loss carryforward can offset former losses with current
profits for tax purposes. Due to this non-debt tax shield the tax elasticity with regard to
interest deduction should be lower.
The size of the business activity may have an indirect impact on the accession to external
finance (e.g., Gordon and Lee, 2001). For instance, since it may be an indicator for the
level of disclosure, it could influence the firm-specific cost of external capital. Therefore,
we use the natural log of total assets as an indicator for the firm size.
Tangibility as the share of tangible assets in total assets is considered as an additional firm-
level control variable. However, the expected impact on the use of debt is ambiguous. On
the one hand it can be assumed that higher tangibility can be regarded by creditors as an
increasing amount of collateral. In this case, the access to additional debt should be easier,
since agency costs of debt are reduced by the value of collateral. On the other hand, interest
deduction may be crowded out by the non-debt tax shields generated by depreciation and
investment tax credits related with tangible assets (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980).
In accordance with previous studies analysing determinants of the capital structure choice,
we control for variations in companies’ profitability.11 The EBITDA to assets ratio is
continuous data of group structures are not available in the cases of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, and
Romania.
10 Obviously this can only be a rough indicator for a tax loss carryforward. However, detailed information
on accumulated losses as stated in companies’ tax statements is not available for our sample.
11 See, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995), Graham (2000).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev.
Firm level variables
Debt to Assets Ratio Total debt in total assets .676 .229
Loss Carryforward Loss in previous year, binary .162 .368
Total Assets Total assets stocks in e thousand 247,564 3,904,887
Tangibility Tangible assets in total assets .236 .233
Profitability EBITDA to total assets .113 .159
Tax variables
τC Statutory corporate income tax rate .347 .069
τD Effective tax rate on dividends .159 .072
τ I Effective tax rate on interest income .281 .132
(τC + τD)− (τ I) Tax benefit of debt relative to .225 .137
equity income
τG Effective tax rate on capital gains .121 .056
on the disposal of shares
Further country characteristics
Inflation Rate Inflation rate .026 .009
GDP GDP in billion US dollars 1,028 570
The descriptive statistics are based on a sample of stand-alone companies and parent companies of a group
of affiliated companies. The sample includes 3,181,931 observations of companies during the period from
2000 until 2005. The firm-level data are taken from the AMADEUS database provided by Bureau van Dijk.
The version used here contains data from 1999 until 2005. Tax data are taken from several annual volumes
of the European Tax Handbook edited by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and
from tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC and KPMG. Other country variables such as nominal
GDP in US dollars and inflation rates originate from World Bank World Development Indicators (2006).
used in order to avoid endogeneity problems. As explained in Section 2.2, due to con-
flicting theories about capital structure choice the predicted sign of the coefficient remains
undetermined.
With respect to the country-level variables, the tax variables described in Section 3.1 are
of particular interest. We collect the statutory corporate income tax rates adjusted for
additional surcharges and other profit taxes at the company level. Furthermore, effective
dividend tax rates, which consider the type of tax system and the profit taxation at the
company level, are calculated. Moreover, we calculate effective tax rates imposed on inter-
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est income, which are modified by restrictions on interest deductions at the corporate level.
Finally, for additional regressions, we also collect effective tax rates on capital gains from
the disposal of shares. The detailed description of the tax data in Section 3.1 suggests that
we have sufficient variations available in the tax data. Due to the fact that the respective
tax reforms came into force in different years, we should be able to distinguish between
tax effects and macro-economic time effects.
Furthermore, we consider the inflation rate as a country-level control variable. This could
reflect potential changes in the relative cost of debt capital depending on how nominal
and real lending rates are affected by inflation.12 Finally, the local GDP is used as an
instrument variable. Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics of the data.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Investigation Approach
Our empirical identification strategy relies on the international variation in the taxation of
corporate profits and personal capital income in 23 European countries. For the empirical
analysis, we use the debt to assets ratio as our dependent variable. Subsequently, a simple
empirical approach can be used to regress the company’s debt ratio on the tax benefit
of debt described by (τCi,t + τ
D
i,t) − τ Ii,t and a vector Xi,t of firm- and country-level control
variables. The subscript i denotes the company and t the year. Thus, the following
empirical estimation can be set up:
Debt toAssetsRatioi,t = α0+α1[(τ
C
i,t + τ
D
i,t)− τ Ii,t]+α2Xi,t+δi+γt+i,t. (2)
12 A country-level indirect indicator for changes in interest rates is used, since our firm-level data do not
provide reliable information on the companies’ individual lending conditions.
18
Global trends in company finance and business cycle effects are controlled by a time-fixed
effect γt, and heterogeneity between companies is controlled by a company-fixed effect δi.
With regard to the tax benefit of debt, we expect a positive sign for α1.
Some firm-level characteristics such as losses or the share of tangible assets can serve as non-
debt tax shields at the company level (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). The tax sensitivity
with respect to the corporate tax rate τC should decrease with increasing tangibility, or if
a company has a loss carryforward. Hence, in order to identify the effects of non-debt tax
shields on the debt share, we use two interaction terms between the corporate tax rate τC
and tangibility, as well as between τC and a dummy variable indicating companies with
a loss carryforward. Thus, the following estimation equation can be used, for which we
expect negative signs for α3 and α4 .
Debt toAssetsRatioi,t = α0+α1[(τ
C
i,t + τ
D
i,t)− τ Ii,t]+α2Xi,t+α3(τCi,t xTangibilityi,t)
+ α4(τ
C
i,t xLossCarryforwardi,t)+δi+γt+i,t. (3)
An underlying assumption of the presented estimation equation is that every marginal
variation of the relative tax benefit of debt, (τC + τD) − τ I , has the same impact on the
debt share, irrespective of which of the components is changed. In additional regressions,
we relax this assumption and estimate the effects for the three components separately:
corporate tax rate, dividend tax rate and the tax rate on interest income. Then, equation
(3) becomes
Debt toAssetsRatioi,t = α0+α11τ
C
i,t+α12τ
D
i,t+α13τ
I
i,t+α2Xi,t+α3(τ
C
i,t xTangibilityi,t)
+ α4(τ
C
i,t xLossCarryforwardi,t)+δi+γt+i,t. (4)
We expect positive signs for the impact of the corporate tax rate α11, and for the impact
of effective dividend taxation α12, while a negative sign for the impact of a higher interest
tax α13 can be expected.
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4.2 Regression Results
The empirical analysis is based on the investigation approach described in Section 4.1. We
employ the fraction of debt in total assets as the dependent variable. First, we empirically
test whether capital structure choices are affected by differences in the taxation of equity
and of debt capital at the company- as well as at the shareholder level. A first set of
regression results is presented in Table 4. Since the tax data vary only at the country
level, standard errors are clustered within country-year cells in order to avoid overstated
significance levels (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004; Moulton, 1990).
We begin with observations of stand-alone companies, i.e. companies which do not belong
to a group of affiliated companies. Results based on this sample are shown in Table 4.
In comparison to previous analyses such as that of Graham (1999) we are able to control
for individual heterogeneity between companies, which might be correlated with the tax
effects, by means of company-fixed effects. It should be mentioned that the company-
specific effects nest country-fixed effects and thus, remove cross-sectional heterogeneity
between countries. In this manner, relatively time invariant country characteristics such
as creditor rights or the type of banking system are entirely controlled for.
The amount of total assets is used as a control for the size of the company. However, the
size of a firm’s business activity may be endogenous, since the analysed opportunity to
avoid taxes by financial planning may have an impact on the size of invested capital. For
this reason, instrument variable (IV) estimations are carried out. At the first stage ln(Total
Assets) is regressed on all exogenous variables and on the natural log of the country’s GDP,
where the firm is located. When controlling for the heterogeneity between countries, the
variable ln(GDP) constitutes a suitable instrument, since GDP indicates the size of the
local market. Hence, the correlation between invested capital and GDP originates from
local economic opportunities.13 On the other hand, the debt ratio should not be directly
13 A more formal t-test reveals significance of the ln(GDP) at the 5% level in all first stage specifications.
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Table 4: Taxation and Financial Structure Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τC+τD−τ I .289∗∗ .311∗∗∗
(.111) (.115)
τC .079 .174∗ .143 .007
(.105) (.107) (.106) (.101)
τD .270∗ .271∗ .272∗
(.141) (.141) (.140)
τ I -.553∗ -.564∗ -.581∗
(.309) (.310) (.308)
τG -.146
(.136)
ln(Inflation Rate) -.001 .000 -.001 .000 -.000 -.003
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Tangibility .068∗∗∗ .144∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗ .131∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗ .130∗∗∗
(.018) (.016) (.018) (.014) (.014) (.014)
Profitability -.131∗∗∗ -.131∗∗∗ -.129∗∗∗ -.130∗∗∗ -.131∗∗∗ -.127∗∗∗
(.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030)
Loss Carryforward .027∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗ .057∗∗∗ .057∗∗∗ .057∗∗∗
(.002) (.008) (.002) (.008) (.008) (.008)
ln(Total Assets) -.003∗∗ -.003∗ -.003∗ -.003∗ -.003∗ -.001
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.001)
τC x Tangibility -.238∗∗∗ -.197∗∗∗ -.195∗∗∗ -.191∗∗∗
(.068) (.068) (.068) (.068)
τC x Loss Carryforward -.093∗∗∗ -.089∗∗∗ -.088∗∗∗ -.086∗∗∗
(.022) (.021) (.021) (.021)
Adj. R2 .8449 .8451 .8449 .8451 .8451 .8449
Observations 3,162,461 3,162,461 3,162,461 3,162,461 3,162,461 3,162,461
Dependent variable is the debt to assets ratio. Robust standard errors, which are clustered within country-
year cells, are indicated in parentheses. (∗), (∗∗), (∗∗∗) denote significance at the (10%),(5%), and (1%)
level. A full set of firm and time dummies is included. All regressions are instrument variable (IV)
estimations, for which the natural log of GDP is used as an instrument for ln(TotalAssets). Solely second
stage regression results are presented.
affected by the growth path of the local market, in which the firm is located.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 show the expected significant positive effect of the tax
benefit of debt on leverage. In column (2) we test whether non-debt tax shields serve
as substitutes for interest deduction at the corporate level. The statutory tax rate at
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the corporate level is interacted with both tangibility and the loss carryforward dummy
variable. The results confirm the expected negative effect of a higher non-debt tax shield
on the tax incentive to use debt. While controlling for the respective tax effects, the
estimated coefficients of tangibility and having a loss carryforward, respectively, indicate
positive effects of collaterals and losses on the financial leverage more clearly. Moreover,
the positive effect of the tax benefit of debt on the financial leverage increases slightly.
The positive coefficients for the tax benefit of debt imply that companies increase their
debt share with an increasing tax advantage of debt relative to equity. The estimated effect
in column (2) of Table 4, for example, suggests that an increase of the tax benefit of debt by
10 percentage points leads to an increase of the fraction of debt by 3.11 percentage points.
At first glance, the magnitudes of the estimated tax effects seem to be small. Non-tax
factors such as agency costs, which we capture chiefly by the fixed effects estimator, seem
to play an important role in practice. However, our elasticities are significantly higher in
comparison to the previous literature based on US firm data. Graham (1999), for example,
reports only a coefficient of 0.100 and Gordon and Lee (2001) report a coefficient of 0.057
for similar measures for the relative tax benefit of debt.14
Let us take a brief look at the other control variables used in the regressions. Our results do
not suggest a significant impact of a country’s inflation rate on the fractions of debt. Higher
tangibility has a significant positive effect on the use of debt capital. The positive sign of
the coefficient could result from lower agency costs, since tangible assets serve as collaterals.
Profitable companies tend to lower their leverage significantly. Enhanced opportunities for
internal financing could be one reason for that finding. Finally, a loss carryforward induces
higher debt ratios. Since our variable is constructed as a historical earnings measure, this
could be due to an alleviated equity base as a result of previous losses. However, if both
variables also capture future economic perspectives, the result would be in line with the free
14 Comparing our results with previous studies we also find a higher elasticity of debt ratios. Evaluated
at mean values of financial leverage and the tax benefit of debt, the elasticity of the debt ratio is
0.102 in the European case compared with 0.019 (Graham, 1999) and 0.024 (Gordon and Lee, 2001),
respectively, in the US case.
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cash flow hypothesis (e.g., Stulz, 1990; Maloney et al., 1993). Since loss-generating firms
probably feature worse investment opportunities, interest payments might be a suitable
way of restricting management discretion (Jensen, 1986). As for the size of the company,
we find a negative impact on leverage. While interpreting the results it should be noted
that we use company-fixed effects, which already control for the mean size of the company.
In a second step, we decompose the tax benefit of debt and individually estimate the
impact of the different tax components. The results are presented in columns (3) - (6) of
Table 4, and confirm our theoretical expectations. We find a significant positive impact
of the effective dividend-tax rate, as well as a negative impact of the tax rate on interest
income on financial leverage. In conclusion, the significant effects of personal income tax
patterns and the highly significant coefficients of the interaction terms confirm that both
corporate and shareholder taxation do in fact matter for capital structure choices.
In column (5) of Table 4 we introduce the capital gains tax, τG. However, no significant
impact of capital gains taxation can be found. In additional estimations not presented
here, we consider tax rates on capital gains in the case of non-qualified shareholding.
The finding of an insignificant impact of capital gains taxation is confirmed by all these
additional estimations. One may speculate whether this result is caused by the fact that a
capital gains tax entails no additional tax burden. Merely a frontloading of tax payments
can occur if it is possible to deduct the initial values of shares from the taxable amount of
future personal capital income taxes.
In column (6) of Table 4 we neglect any impact of personal capital income taxes on capital
structures and consider solely the corporate profit tax rate. Given the significant effects
for the impact of dividend and interest taxation provided by columns (3) and (4), we are
now facing at a possible bias if we do not control for personal capital income taxation.
The regression result shows that the effect of the corporate tax rate is significantly biased
if personal taxation is neglected. We estimate a downward biased and insignificant tax
effect due to the omitted variables. This specification therefore clearly supports the view
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that personal income taxes should be considered when tax effects on capital structures are
analysed.
In a third step, we focus on different groups to identify possible differences in tax sensi-
tivities. From a theoretical point of view, we would expect a smaller impact of capital
income taxation at the personal level on the financial decisions of larger companies with
a higher number of shareholders. In the case of bigger companies with several sharehold-
ers, the decisions on the capital structure might be made by managers at the corporate
level rather than at the shareholder level. Therefore, we carry out additional regressions
where we distinguish between different types of companies. The results are presented in
Table 5. We employ two specific company types: parent companies of a group of affiliated
companies and the 25 percent smallest stand-alone companies in each of the considered
years. The specific types of companies are denoted by a dummy variable, referred to as
‘Company Type’. The ‘Company Type’ dummy equals one if a company fulfils the rele-
vant characteristics, while zero if this is not the case. Subsequently, the interaction terms
between ‘Company Type’ and the tax variables indicate differences in the tax effects for
the respective company type in comparison to the basic effects of the whole sample.15
In the regressions shown by columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we consider the stand-alone
companies used in our previous analysis. The dummy variable ‘Company Type’ indicates
the observations of the 25 per cent smallest stand-alone companies in each considered
year. The results clearly support the expectation that smaller companies rely more on
shareholder finance and thus, shareholder taxation becomes more relevant. Column (1) in-
dicates a three times higher tax coefficient for the smaller companies of 0.489 in comparison
to a coefficient of 0.163 for all stand-alone companies. This means that the capital struc-
ture of smaller firms reacts more flexibly to tax incentives. The results shown in column
(2) also confirm that the leverage is affected by personal capital income taxes, especially
15 In order to handle possible technical problems arising from self-selection into one of the subgroups,
we eliminate all observations of companies which switch between the respective sub-groups in different
years. In this manner, a fixed-effects estimator leads to consistent results, since the company fixed-effect
also controls for the selection into one of the sub-samples (see Verbeek and Nijman, 1992; Vella, 1998).
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Table 5: Different Groups of Companies
‘Company Type’ Indicates ...
25% Smallest Parent Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τC+τD−τ I .163∗ .308∗∗∗ .310∗∗∗
(.090) (.115) (.115)
Company Type x [τC+τD−τ I ] .326∗∗∗ -.224∗∗∗
(.078) (.048)
τC .214∗ .174∗
(.132) (.107)
Company Type x τC .135 -.310∗∗
(.107) (.141)
τD .139 .271∗
(.112) (.141)
Company Type x τD .326∗∗∗ -.184∗∗
(.096) (.076)
τ I -.088 -.056∗
(.157) (.310)
Company Type x τ I -1.11∗∗ .322∗
(.512) (.144)
ln(Inflation Rate) -.001 -.001 .001 .000 .000
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.003)
Tangibility .114∗∗∗ .116∗∗∗ .144∗∗∗ .144∗∗∗ .131∗∗∗
(.030) (.029) (.016) (.016) (.014)
Profitability -.163∗∗∗ -.164∗∗∗ -.131∗∗ -.131∗∗∗ -.130∗∗∗
(.025) (.026) (.030) (.030) (.030)
Loss Carryforward .058∗∗∗ .058∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ .057∗∗∗
(.013) (.013) (.008) (.008) (.008)
ln(Total Assets) -.005∗∗ -.005∗∗ -.003∗ -.003∗ -.003∗
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
τC x Tangibility -.194∗∗ -.201∗∗ -.237∗∗∗ -.238∗∗∗ -.197∗∗∗
(.100) (.097) (.068) (.068) (.068)
τC x Loss Carryforward -.094∗∗∗ -.092∗∗∗ -.093∗∗∗ -.093∗∗∗ -.089∗∗∗
(.035) (.035) (.022) (.022) (.021)
Adj. R2 .8674 .8674 .8457 .8457 .8457
Observations 2,085,250 2,085,250 3,181,931 3,181,931 3,181,931
Dependent variable is the debt to assets ratio. Robust standard errors, which are clustered within country-
year cells, are indicated in parentheses. (∗), (∗∗), (∗∗∗) denote significance at the (10%),(5%), and (1%)
level. All estimates include a full set of firm- and time dummies. Regressions are instrument variable (IV)
estimations, for which the natural log of GDP is used as an instrument for ln(TotalAssets). Only second
stage regression results are presented.
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in case of smaller companies. Thus, smaller firms seem to have less non-tax restrictions
such as agency conflicts between shareholders and management.
The results depicted by columns (3) - (5) in Table 5 are based on an extended sample.
In addition to all stand-alone companies, we now also consider companies that serve as
a parent company of a group of companies. We consider parent companies rather than
subsidiaries of a group of companies, because we believe that only parent companies have
financing conditions that are fairly similar to those of stand-alone companies.16 The results
of column (3) are similar to those based only on stand-alone companies in Table 4.
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 we proceed by dividing parent companies and stand-alone
companies. Here, the dummy variable ‘Company Type’ is one, if a company is a parent
company, and remains zero in all other cases. Column (4) shows a significantly smaller
elasticity for parent companies with respect to the tax benefit of debt. More specifically,
column (5) shows that parent companies are significantly less sensitive with regard to the
corporate profit tax, the dividend tax, and the tax imposed on interest income. Since
being organized by means of several affiliated companies can be interpreted as an indicator
for bigger firms, it seems reasonable that personal taxes such as dividend and interest
taxes are less important. The irrelevance of the corporate profit tax is surprising. This
result can most likely be explained by enhanced tax planning opportunities at lower tiers
of a group of companies, in particular in the case of a multinational group. If debt is
distributed within the whole company group according to the relative level of taxation at
different locations, tax effects on the fraction of debt cannot be identified by means of
a fixed-effects estimator, which removes all cross-sectional variation between countries.17
Another explanation might be the fact that special-purpose entities are used as tax shelters
(Graham and Tucker, 2006), and we cannot control for this kind of non-debt tax shields.
16 Personal taxation should be particularly less important for subsidiaries which use intercompany financ-
ing instead of external capital from individual investors.
17 Note that Huizinga, Laeven and Nicode`me (2008), e.g., pool observations within parent-company cells
in order to identify effects of the corporate tax rate on multinationals’ capital structures.
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5 Conclusion
Theoretical considerations about companies’ capital structure choices suggest that the
total tax benefit of debt financing relative to equity taxation does in fact matter. We
have empirically analysed the tax effects of both personal capital income and corporate
profit taxation on capital structure choices using a comprehensive panel of firm-level data
from 23 European countries in a standardised form. For each country and year during the
period from 2000 until 2005, we have collected detailed tax rates for the corporate profit
tax, dividend tax and taxes on interest income. We then calculated the tax benefit of using
debt relative to equity financing.
Our basic empirical results identify a significant positive effect of the relative tax benefit
of debt on the companies’ debt ratio. The results suggest that differences in the tax levels
of the return on equity relative to the tax on the return on debt capital do in fact play
a significant role. The tax elasticity of the capital structure seems to be higher for our
European sample than for US companies analysed in prior studies. Moreover, we can
confirm substitutive relationships between non-debt tax shields and tax incentives to use
debt. In a second step, we have decomposed the different tax components of the tax benefit
of debt. Subsequently, we find a significant impact of the dividend tax rate and the tax
imposed on interest income on companies’ debt ratios. In principle, the results support
the view that capital structure choices are significantly affected by personal capital income
taxation. In a third step, we have finally focused on specific company types. Particularly,
our results suggest that the debt ratios of smaller companies are more heavily affected by
the tax benefit of debt. The 25 per cent smallest companies in our basic sample show a
three times higher tax elasticity relative to all companies.
Finally, our results can be used to predict effects of tax reforms on companies’ capital
structure choices. In 2008 and 2009, for example, an important tax reform will take effect
in Germany. In 2007, German corporate taxation was almost neutral with respect to
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different sources of finance, i.e. the tax benefit of debt was approx. zero.18 However, in
2009 the German tax system will undergo fundamental changes with respect to different
sources of finance. The corporate tax rate in particular will be reduced and the German
local business tax will be modified. However, the most important amendment with respect
to financial decisions is the fact that the exemption of half of the dividends from personal
capital income tax is abolished. As a consequence, the tax benefit of debt will increase
heavily by approx. 19 percentage points. Let us consider specification (2) from Table
4. The point estimator for the impact of the tax benefit of debt on the fraction of debt
suggests that an increase in the tax benefit of debt of about 19 percentage points will result
in an increase of a company’s leverage by 5.9 percentage points. Yet, in the case of small
companies, specification (1) from Table 5 suggests that the German tax reform will lead
to an increase of the leverage by approx. 9.3 percentage points.
Although our results are qualitatively in line with previous results in the literature, the
magnitudes of the estimated tax effects exceed those found in previous studies. Further-
more, we find significant differences in the tax elasticity with respect to capital structure
choices between different types of companies. Hence, the results suggest that the capital
structures of companies are significantly affected by non-tax factors. Since tax planning
by means of financial decisions still does not seem to be fully flexible, from a theoretical
point of view it can be expected that underlying real investment decisions are also affected
by taxation. However, an empirical analysis of this relationship remains an interesting
challenge for future research.
18 In Germany, the tax benefit of debt depends on the multiplier of the German local business tax
(Gewerbesteuer). For the purpose of this paper we always use the mean multiplier of municipalities
which have a miniumum of 50.000 inhabitants each. In 2007, the mean multiplier was 432%.
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